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CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS TO EQUAL PROTECTION IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Historically, the Supreme Court has required a showing of particu-
larized harm to prove an equal protection violation. For example, in
McCleskey v. Kemp,' the Supreme Court found no equal protection
violation 2 despite statistical studies showing that defendants charged
with killing white victims were four times more likely to be sentenced
to death than those charged with killing black victims. 3 The Court
reasoned that these statistics did not demonstrate that racial considera-
tions had played a role in McCleskey's particular sentence.4 Although
the requirement of particularized harm is consistent with the tradi-
tional common law view of causation, it necessarily causes courts to
neglect more subtle, systemic risks created by the operation of gov-
ernment. Often a criminal defendant cannot identify a specific
wrongdoer, nor can he prove that racial discrimination more likely
than not tainted his particular conviction.5 Sometimes, as in
McCleskey, all that a defendant can show is that, after multiple-
regression analyses have accounted for plausible non-racial explana-
tions, disparities still remain.
The requirement of particularized harm is of special concern in
equal protection cases today as social mores have largely driven racial
animus underground, making discrimination far more likely to occur
surreptitiously.6 This problem is exacerbated in the criminal justice
context, in which government actors often wield vast amounts of dis-
cretion - discretion that allows those who discriminate to mask their
1 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
2 Id. at 299.
3 See id.
4 See id. at 294-95, 297.
5 See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1056 (978) (noting
the "impossible burden of isolating the particular conditions of discrimination produced by and
mechanically linked to the behavior of an identified blameworthy perpetrator"); cf. Herskovits v.
Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 475 (Wash. I983) (addressing the causation
problems when a doctor's negligent diagnosis reduced a cancer patient's chance of survival); Sin-
dell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Cal. 198o) (addressing the claims of a plaintiff who
was unable to identify precisely which pharmaceutical company manufactured a defective drug).
6 Some commentators additionally, albeit controversially, suggest that racism can exist uncon-
sciously, caused by a lack of empathy. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 9o HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1976) (de-
scribing the problem of "racially selective indifference"); Charles R. Lawrence HI, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44
(1987). But cf, e.g., Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993) (distinguish-
ing "cronyism" from racism in a Title VH action because, although selecting one's friends may
result in numerical disparities, "it is not the same kind of iniquity as racial discrimination").
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impermissible motives.7 Ironically, the harm that particularized in-
quiries are thus most likely to overlook is one that is especially damag-
ing to the legitimacy of the law: systemic racial discrimination in the
administration of criminal justice.
This Note examines the reasons for and the ramifications of a new
equal protection perspective that would recognize not only traditional
particularized harms, but also risks - uncertain, probabilistic repre-
sentations of traditional harms.8 Rather than ignoring risk as an un-
remediable possibility of harm, the new paradigm would view risk as a
harm in itself.9 A constitutional risk perspective would not necessarily
change any underlying values or normative goals of the legal system,
but it would enhance the law's ability to recognize a set of harms hid-
den by the current paradigm of particularity. It would allow a reas-
sessment of "the legal significance of discrete, isolated decisions that
are susceptible to a non-racial explanation when considered individu-
ally, but reveal a pattern clearly shaped by racial sentiment when con-
sidered en masse."10
Part I summarizes the traditional requirement of particularity: its
underlying reasons, its costs, and its effect on racial discrimination
claims related to sentencing, prosecution, and policing. A brief exami-
nation reveals that the particularity requirement unnecessarily causes
courts to ignore statistical data and to fail to remedy systemic dis-
crimination. Part II conceptualizes a regime of constitutional risk and
addresses the difficult problem of providing an appropriate remedy. In
a regime that recognized risks as harms, defendants could make claims
for less than certain, probabilistic harms, so delineating proper reme-
dies would therefore be crucial to prevent a collapse of the system.
Part II argues that guidelines for the exercise of discretion may create
the right balance between security against discrimination and practical
flexibility. Part III discusses the possibilities for a constitutional risk
regime and suggests areas for further research.
7 See infra note i o.
8 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. i, 12 (x989) (advocating a shift in state action doctrine
from a Newtonian world view focused on "isolated forces acting on particular individuals" to a
post-Newtonian, relativistic view focused on individuals' interactions with the entire fabric of a
system).
9 Cf. Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 48! (Pearson, J., concurring) (suggesting that the "injury" caused
by a doctor's negligent diagnosis could be defined as the decreased chance of surviving cancer).
10 Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, iox HARV. L. REV. 1388, 14o6 (1988).
20992001]
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I. THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
Equal protection doctrine generally requires both a particularized
actor and a particularized harm: a litigant must prove not only that a
government actor was motivated by a discriminatory purpose,' 1 but
also that the discriminatory act affected the outcome of his case.' 2
The Court has adhered rigidly to these particularity requirements, in-
ducing some commentators to describe the doctrine as limiting equal
protection violations only to cases in which a government official is
"out to get" an individual based on impermissible grounds.' 3 Except
in a few select areas, 14 statistical evidence rarely furnishes a basis for a
successful equal protection claim.' 5
A. The Reasons for Particularity
The reluctance of courts to grant relief based on statistical show-
ings of inexplicable racial disparities is not without reasonable basis.
The requirement of particularity is closely linked to traditional En-
lightenment notions of moral responsibility and free will, and a rush to
embrace statistical data could significantly compromise these widely
held values. In addition, statistical analyses can be plagued with sub-
tle technical flaws that are difficult to detect. When courts face these
concerns as well as the problems of remedy discussed in Part II they
are understandably hesitant.
i. Moral Responsibility and Free Will. - The requirement of par-
ticularity is not surprising in light of common law causation principles,
11 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
12 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 48! U.S. 279, 292 (1987); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984) (holding that standing requires "personal injury fairly traceable to the [wrongdoer's]
allegedly unlawful conduct"); DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE
OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 117 (iggg) (criticizing the McCleskey Court for having introduced this
new standard in discrimination cases).
13 E.g., Kennedy, supra note io, at 1405 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (x977) (grand jury); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 24-25 (x971) (school desegregation); see also Daniel R. Or-
tiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1119-34 (1989) (arguing that
in jury selection, voting, and education cases, the intent requirement is significantly attenuated).
15 The Supreme Court typically accepts statistical evidence only when a law's application is so
racially disparate that the numbers permit the inference of discriminatory intent. For example, in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (196o), the Court found unconstitutional a twenty-eight-sided
voting district that redistricted all but four or five of 400 black voters, but no white voters. Id. at
341; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (x886) (finding an equal protection violation
when city supervisors denied permits to two hundred Chinese laundries while granting permits to
eighty non-Chinese laundries).
[VoI. 114:2o982100
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which are binary or mechanistic,1 6 rather than probabilistic. 7  These
principles arise from a Newtonian perspective - every action arises
through the will of a free moral actor' 8 - and accord with traditional
notions of moral responsibility in the law' 9 and the structure of private
law litigation.20 Thus, just as tort law requires a plaintiff to show that
the defendant more likely than not caused his injury, constitutional
law requires a party to show that a government actor's racial animus
more likely than not changed the outcome of the case. This under-
standing of causation creates particularity requirements along two
closely related veins: First, the law seeks to blame a specific actor, not
societal conditions or the system in general. Second, the law requires
that the actor have actually harmed the particular defendant.
The requirement of a particularized wrongdoer manifests itself in
the equal protection requirement of purposeful discrimination and in
the rejection of statistical proof of harm when a claimant cannot iden-
tify a specific wrongdoer. 21 For example, in McCleskey the Court cited
jury uniqueness in denying McCleskey's claim.22  Because the jury
acted only once, no consistent pattern of racism could be imputed to
it.23 From the standpoint of individual responsibility, this conclusion
makes logical sense - a single point, per se, cannot form a pattern.
The systemic result, however, is that discriminatory decisionmakers go
undetected, and structural safeguards that could prevent or impede
racist decisionmaking are not considered.
The focus on actual harm to the particular defendant bars recovery
when statistical studies can demonstrate only a risk of discrimination,
not actual discrimination. 24  This doctrinal rule has normative and
practical support. Normatively, denying recovery in the absence of ac-
16 See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORI,, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 64-71 (2d ed. 1985);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870--96o: THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 52-57 (1992).
17 Indeed, even if an act or occurrence can be shown to be more probable than not, under tra-
ditional causation principles such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient for recovery. See David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort
System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984).
18 See Tribe, supra note 8, at 5-7 (describing Newtonian mechanics).
19 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1285 (1976) (noting that intention and fault formed the foundation of the traditional private law
system); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 858.
20 See Chayes, supra note ig, at 1282-83 (describing private law litigation as bipolar and as
involving self-contained episodes confined to discrete parties).
21 Cf. Freeman, supra note 5, at 1052-57 (describing this "perpetrator perspective" that causes
courts to "view[] racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided
conduct of particular actors").
22 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987).
23 See id. at 295 n.i5.
24 See id. at 291 n.7.
200I] 2101
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tual harm forgives transgressions in which no evil results 25 - "no
harm, no foul." Practically, compensating every risk that government
action imposes would involve enormous transaction costs and meas-
urement difficulties and might well lead to an excessive level of rights
enforcement and an overly cautious society.26 Every government ac-
tion theoretically harbors some risk of discrimination; to compensate
for all such risks would be unmanageable, if not impossible. 7
The response to these arguments is two-fold. First, it is possible to
distinguish between individual actors and the government. Forgive-
ness is less normatively appealing when applied to the government,
especially because racial discrimination seriously undermines the le-
gitimacy of the criminal justice system. Second, the practical difficul-
ties of compensating all risks do not require courts to compensate no
risks. By compensating some subset of "substantial" risks delineated
as a matter of policy, the law can avoid the slippery slope.2 8
2. Flawed Statistical Regressions. - From a practical standpoint,
courts may be reluctant to open equal protection doctrine to statistical
proof for technical reasons. 29 One of the most significant criticisms of
statistical studies on discrimination is the inability of multiple regres-
sions to account for all race-neutral explanations for racial disparities.
Statistically, some crimes or behaviors may be more prevalent among
members of certain minority groups; thus statistics showing dispropor-
tionate sentencing, prosecution, or policing may not reflect any dis-
crimination at all.30 Although regressions account for many race-
neutral explanations and are thus more sophisticated than the raw
numerical comparisons featured in disparate impact arguments,31 re-
25 See Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 882-83.
26 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 76-77 (1974).
27 These concerns probably underlie the well accepted tort doctrine that one cannot recover
for "negligence in the air" (a negligent act that results in no injury). See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., x62 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.). See generally HORWITZ, supra note
z6, at 56 (discussing the "negligence in the air" doctrine). Similarly, the infeasibility of awarding
reversal for any de minimis trial mistake probably underlies the harmless error doctrine.
28 See infra note 79. For a discussion of slippery slopes and the problem of line drawing, see
Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).
29 The methods by which judges and juries handle statistical and probabilistic evidence would
obviously be critical to the successful implementation of a constitutional risk perspective. A gen-
eral discourse on these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the
advantages of statistical data over experts' judgments, see William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein,
Statistics, Not Experts (Feb. 11, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
30 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (i996) (implying that different racial
groups commit crimes with varying degrees of frequency); cf City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (rejecting the "assumption that minorities will choose a particular
trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population").
31 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Multiple-
regression analysis is particularly well suited to identify the influence of impermissible considera-
[Vol. 114:2o982102
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gressions can never be perfect, and some race-neutral factors may be
omitted due to a lack of data.32  Historically, courts have cited pre-
cisely this possible omission as a reason to disregard statistical show-
ings of racial disparity.33
This concern may be valid, but surely parties must do more than
speculate about possible flaws to invalidate statistical evidence. The
key question is whether the omission of potentially explanatory factors
creates sufficient doubt in a study's accuracy to warrant the denial of
all relief. Although the omission of variables may affect the probative
value of a regression, it should not always render a study entirely in-
admissible as evidence of discrimination. 34  As some statisticians sug-
gest, courts need to consider just how significant a permissible "un-
known" factor would have to be to account for the racial disparities
observed.3s For example, although there may be a five to one racial
disparity in traffic stops, it is improbable that blacks are five times
more likely to speed or to drive with a broken tail light than whites.
3 6
The other major problem with using statistical data in the equal
protection context is the question of class definition: how one defines
one's statistical sample can affect the results of a study. For example,
there may be a racial disparity among murder sentences throughout a
state, yet there may be no such disparity in a particular county.
Courts do, however, face similar problems in mass-tort class actions as
tions in sentencing, since it is able to control for permissible factors that may explain an appar-
ently arbitrary pattern.").
32 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Arm-
strong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 627-33 (x998) (discussing a method to account for correlations
between non-racial factors and race and suggesting that collecting data on nonprosecutions is no-
toriously difficult).
33 E.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470 (citing a lack of evidence regarding "similarly situated per-
sons" of other races); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.14 (distinguishing death penalty cases in which
there is "no common standard by which to evaluate all defendants" from jury venire selection
cases in which the number of factors is purportedly limited and, "to a great degree, objectively
verifiable"); Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 56o, 562 (Ga. 1995) (finding statistical evidence insuffi-
cient and criticizing the potential omission of other race-neutral explanatory factors).
34 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
3S See Joseph L. Gastwirth & Tapan K. Nayak, Statistical Aspects of Cases Concerning Racial
Discrimination in Drug Sentencing: Stephens v. State and U.S. v. Armstrong, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 583, 590-96 (1997) (suggesting a statistical technique to make this determination).
Professor McAdams has made the related suggestion that, when relevant data is unavailable, trial
courts should fill in "data gaps" with reasonable assumptions. See McAdams, supra note 32, at
634-40. For example, although numerical data may not exist on the number of nonblack drivers
who speed, it is reasonable to assume that at least some do. See id. at 632, 637.
36 But see United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the defendant's
claim of discriminatory enforcement of a bicycle headlamp law because, even if the law was en-
forced solely against blacks, the defendant failed to show that whites rode bicycles in violation of
the statute).
2001] 21IO 3
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well as in statutory discrimination actions, which suggests that this
difficulty is manageable. 37
B. Costs
As already noted, the particularity requirement and its rejection of
statistical evidence have substantial costs. The Court's cramped view
of constitutional harm forces courts to examine only individual cases,
which cannot reveal or redress patterns of racial discrimination. 38
Considered in isolation, nearly all decisions can be rationalized using
permissible explanations; it is only when these decisions are considered
in the aggregate that patterns may emerge that indicate the presence of
impermissible discrimination.39 As a result, the particularity require-
ment obscures the discriminatory decisions of government actors, mak-
ing their already broad discretion effectively unreviewable.
It is true that overt discrimination is readily detectable under the
traditional particularized harm framework. If a judge overtly relies on
race in sentencing defendants to death, or if police departments target
motorists because of their race, the discrimination is plain. But the
particularized framework, though perhaps effective in past "con-
quests"40 of overt discrimination, is wholly inadequate in a contempo-
rary society in which "discrimination takes a form more subtle than
before."41 Contemporary mores and legal pressures have altered the
appearance of racism. Gone are facially discriminatory statutes and
prosecution policies. In their place has arisen a racism cloaked in non-
racial explanations.4 2 Thus, despite a facially neutral statute and the
absence of an overtly discriminatory enforcement policy, regression
37 See, e.g., Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (4 th Cir. 1993) (defining the
class in a Title VII disparate impact action as the available pool of workers).
38 Cf Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1372 & n.i (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that,
in the ex post facto context, a court must examine the effect of a rule change on the class of de-
fendants rather than on the particular defendant because the combination of rules and discretion
involved in sentencing precludes ever proving harm in the individual case); JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 44 (1987) (suggesting that, in the scientific context, looking
analytically at individual pieces reveals little about global interactions or changes); Rosenberg,
supra note 17, at 885 n.141 (suggesting that, in the tort context, case-by-case adjudication often
overlooks aggregate or systemic problems).
39 Cf. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, z98z Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 (I982) (noting that "statistics on employment decisions
that by themselves appear neutral or nonprobative may take on a different meaning when seen in
the context of the company's overall employment activities").
40 Kennedy, supra note io, at 1419.
41 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979); id. ("But [the discrimination] is not less real or
pernicious."); see Kennedy, supra note io, at 1419 (discussing how the purposeful discrimination
requirement "ignores the chameleonlike ability of prejudice to adapt unobtrusively to new sur-
roundings").
42 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2o, at 159o (2d
ed. 1988) (observing that finding a "bigoted decision-maker" can be difficult).
[Vol. 11x4:20982104
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analysis may still show that, even after accounting for all relevant non-
racial factors, minorities are more likely to be arrested, convicted, or
sentenced more harshly. The particularity requirement, however, ren-
ders courts incapable of recognizing such risk-based harm.
The broad discretion traditionally afforded government actors in
investigating, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing defendants exac-
erbates the cloaking phenomenon. 43 Although some discretion is inevi-
table because of the resource allocation and complex balancing ques-
tions involved, 44  broad discretion facilitates the masking of
impermissible motives. Together with the judicial deference that usu-
ally accompanies it, such discretion fosters an environment acutely
susceptible to discrimination. 45
Moreover, the failure to recognize statistical evidence and constitu-
tional risks of discrimination legitimizes government structures and
practices and thereby inhibits not only courts, but also legislatures
from examining them. 46 By denying the existence of discrimination al-
together, courts absolve other "governmental and nongovernmental ac-
tors of responsibility for solving these problems" through alternative
avenues. 47  The inability to remedy a harm does not justify the refusal
to acknowledge its existence. 48 Finally, because requiring particular-
ized harm will almost always result in a finding of nondiscrimination,
courts can theoretically manipulate the required level of particularity
to mask ideological preferences for or against greater equal protec-
tion. 49
43 See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv.
1521, 15211-22 (x98s) (discussing how prosecutors have gained discretion while other actors such
as magistrates, parole boards, and correctional officials have been constrained); infra note 1u5.
44 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (i985) (suggesting that prosecutorial discretion is
necessary because of resource limitations and because of the "systemic costs" of judicial supervi-
sion, which include chilling law enforcement by scrutinizing prosecutorial motives and undermin-
ing prosecutorial effectiveness by "revealing the Government's enforcement policy").
45 See infra note Iio.
46 See Kennedy, supra note io, at I46.
47 Tribe, supra note 8, at 34; see id. at 33-34 (criticizing McCleskey on this ground); cf id. at 30
(arguing that, in a school desegregation case, even if the Court "would have had no impact on ju-
dicial remedies, a judicial proclamation that inner city ghettoization was constitutionally infirm
might have avoided legitimating this nationwide travesty').
48 See id. at 38 (explaining that modernism teaches that "we can see more than we can do,"
but that "this does not mean that we should lie about what we see").
49 Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of
manipulating standing to disguise a decision on the merits); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 428-35 (1999) (describing the use of deterrence-based ar-
guments as a rhetorical strategy to pacify debates and to mask ideological preferences).
This observation does not mean that courts regularly use doctrinal manipulations to achieve
desired substantive outcomes, but the threat that courts might do so nonetheless exists. For ex-
ample, a skeptical observer of ex post facto doctrine could suggest that the Court has manipulated
the required level of particularity to make relief more difficult to obtain: when particularized
harm is easier to prove, the Court requires general systemic harm; when general systemic harm is
2001] 2][O 5
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C. Effects
A brief survey of equal protection doctrine in sentencing, prosecu-
tion, and policing evinces the pervasive culture of particularity and its
consequences. Courts have generally declined to award relief on the
basis of statistical racial disparities, focusing instead on the particular
facts of each case.
z. Sentencing. - Despite various studies showing racial disparities
in sentencing, 0 the bottom line is simple: no court has ever found an
equal protection violation on the basis of racial disparities."1 Although
the reasons for this stark result are complex, the principal decisions
leave little doubt that the particularity requirement has played a criti-
cal role. For example, in McCleskey, although the Court assumed the
validity of the statistical studies arguendo 2 - thus allowing the dis-
cussion to venture beyond surface-level empirical debates - it still de-
nied relief, focusing on the particulars of McCleskey's case. According
to the Court, McCleskey could not claim discrimination because he
was indeed guilty as charged - he had "committed an act for which
the United States Constitution and Georgia laws permit imposition of
the death penalty."5 3  Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the
corollary of the purposeful discrimination requirement of Washington
easier to prove, the Court requires particularized harm. Compare Seling v. Young, 121 S. Ct. 727,
734-35 (2oox) (requiring that "punitiveness" for ex post facto purposes be determined facially -
that is, systemically - and finding that the defendant's particularized showing was insufficient),
with Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1370 (2000) (requiring a claimant to "show that as applied
to his own sentence the law created a significant risk of increasing his punishment").
50 See generally David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner &
Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Em-
pirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638,
1658-62 (1998) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (iggo), which surveyed twenty-
eight statistical studies and found strong evidence of race-of-the-victim discrimination but
equivocal evidence of race-of-the-defendant discrimination); id. at 1676-1710 (discussing capital
sentencing disparities in Philadelphia from 2983 to 2993).
s1 See Kennedy, supra note io, at 1402 ("[A]s far as reported cases disclose, no defendant in
state or federal court has ever successfully challenged his punishment on grounds of racial dis-
crimination in sentencing." (emphasis omitted)).
S2 McCleskey v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 292 n.7 (1987). The empirical validity of racial dispari-
ties in sentencing has been a matter of ongoing controversy, but suspicions of racial discrimination
in capital sentencing are not new. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (2972), several Justices,
including the dissenting Chief Justice Burger, all expressed concerns about racial discrimination in
capital cases. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (blaming standardless statutes for the dis-
criminatory imposition of the death penalty); id. at 3io (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]f any basis
can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally im-
permissible basis of race."); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that, "while the higher
rate of execution among [blacks] is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of dis-
crimination"); id. at 389 n.I 2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (acknowledging disparities).
S3 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297.
21o6 [Vol. 114:2o98
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v. Davis5 4 was that "a criminal defendant must prove that the pur-
poseful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' on him."5
McCleskey had "offer[ed] no evidence specific to his own case that
would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in
his sentence,"' 6 and thus was not entitled to relief.
The McCleskey Court thus manifested a legal consciousness nar-
rowly focused on particular acts. The statistical studies showing racial
disparities in sentencing were discarded as irrelevant to the individual-
ized determination of justice. 17 Even more telling was the Court's re-
vealing statement in a footnote that "[e]ven a sophisticated multiple-
regression analysis ... can only demonstrate a risk that the factor of
race entered into some capital sentencing decisions and a necessarily
lesser risk that race entered into any particular sentencing decision."58
In other words, the risk of racial discrimination, in and of itself, was
simply not enough.
Defendants claiming racial disparities in noncapital sentencing
have fared no better.5 9 After all, if the gravity of capital punishment
54 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring discriminatory intent for equal protection claims).
55 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
56 Id. at 292-93.
57 Lower courts' treatment of racial disparities in capital sentences for rape prior to Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which abolished the death penalty for rape, further demonstrates the
legal culture of particularity. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 146-47 (8th Cir. 1968)
(Blackmun, J.) (focusing on the aggravating factors in the particular case and downplaying statis-
tical disparities); State v. Mayo, 87 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1956) (denying relief despite statistics
showing that over a twenty-year period only one white man but twenty-three black men were
sentenced to death for rape). See generally Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Rape, Racial
Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 99,
107-18 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976) (discussing empirical findings of
racial disparities in capital rape sentencing from 1945 to 1965).
Despite the culture of particularity, the disturbing ramifications of statistical studies became
increasingly apparent to jurists in the early 196os. See Arthur J. Goldberg, Memorandum to the
Conference: Re: Capital Punishment, October Term 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 504 n.!7 (1986);
see also Michael Meltsner, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 28-29 (I973). In fact, although Coker was ultimately decided on Eighth Amend-
ment grounds and did not address racial concerns, such considerations were clearly in the back-
ground. See McCleskey, 48! U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Although the [Coker] Court
did not explicitly mention race, the decision had to have been informed by the specific observa-
tions on rape by both the Chief Justice and Justice Powell in Furman.").
58 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.
S9 See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1995) (discounting racial disparities
among prosecutorial requests for life sentences for repeat drug offenders due to the potential pres-
ence of other permissible explanatory factors). See generally Developments in the Law-Race and
the Criminal Process, 1o HARV. L. REV. 1472, 630-35 (1987) [hereinafter Developments] (tying
disparities in noncapital sentencing to discriminatory parole board decisions). A well-known con-
troversy about racial disparities in noncapital sentencing involves the Sentencing Guidelines'
treatment of crack versus powder cocaine. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protec-
tion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995). The crack/powder cocaine issue, however, is different from
the one addressed in this Note. This Note addresses racial disparities that remain after regression
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has not moved courts to consider statistical evidence, why would non-
capital sentencing? Courts have predictably relied on the particularity
requirement to deny discrimination claims, focusing especially on re-
medial difficulties. 60 As Judge Clark acknowledged in the lower
court's consideration of McCleskey, even if racial bias randomly arose
in twenty percent of all convictions, judges could not simply overturn
them all. 61 Without a direct showing of discrimination in a specific
case, little could be done.
62
2. Prosecution. - As in the sentencing context, defendants have
rarely, if ever, brought successful claims for racially discriminatory
prosecution. 63 Indeed, defendants have rarely succeeded in making
any selective prosecution claim at all.64 In denying relief, courts have
focused less on a particular defendant's acts (as in the sentencing con-
text) and more on the defendant's inability to show that prosecutors
purposefully caused the racial disparities. 6 Only when the statistical
disparities have been outrageous enough to make purposeful discrimi-
nation a virtual certainty have courts granted relief.
For example, in the only recent Supreme Court case dealing with
alleged racially discriminatory prosecution, United States v. Arm-
strong,66 the defendant argued that black crack-cocaine offenders were
accounts for possible race-neutral factors, while the other inquiry focuses on a disparate impact
argument that disregards whether race may be merely correlated with a particular race-neutral
trait (for example, crack cocaine use).
60 See infra Part II.
61 McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 927 (ixth Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Clark, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) ("The societal imperative of maintaining a criminal justice system
... would outweigh the mandate that race or other prejudice not infiltrate the legal process.").
Judge Clark's dissent, however, distinguished capital sentencing, in which any racial discrimina-
tion was impermissible, from noncapital sentencing, which was subject to this pragmatic consid-
eration. See id.
62 See id.
63 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 354 n.* (x997) (arguing that no
American court has ever found a prosecutor to have engaged in racially selective prosecution).
Concededly, besides the one in Armstrong, statistical studies for discriminatory prosecution have
thus far been relatively unsophisticated and episodic. See, e.g., U.S. v. Figueroa-Rocha, No. CR-
94 -2010 3 -JW, 1995 WL 253050, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 27, 1995) (addressing raw numerical dis-
parities in the enforcement of an immigration law); see also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 55-56 (1998) (implying
that a rigorous statistical study would be necessary for credible evaluation of prosecutorial prac-
tices). Given the high cost of such studies and the Court's unwillingness to rely on them even in
death penalty cases, such a result is unsurprising.
64 See McAdams, supra note 32, at 66 n.55.
65 See, e.g.,.Butler v. Cooper, 554 F.2d 645, 647 (4 th Cir. 1977) (denying relief despite studies
showing that eighty-four percent of persons arrested for violating liquor laws were black in a
county with only a thirty-three percent black population). But cf State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834,
840-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (allowing statistical disparities to establish a colorable
claim of discrimination and thus permitting discovery).
66 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
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disproportionately tried under harsher federal laws .6  Statistics re-
vealed that every one of the twenty-four federal crack cocaine cases
tried by the local federal defenders office involved black defendants,
and affidavits suggested that white offenders had been tried only in
state court, in which penalties were considerably lighter.68  Based on
this evidence, the district court granted the defendant discovery of the
prosecution's records. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
evidence failed to show that "similarly situated individuals of a differ-
ent race were not prosecuted,"69 and thus that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to warrant discovery.70
3. Policing. - Even if explicit racial profiling were to be found
unconstitutional, 71 similar doctrinal problems would hinder redress of
discriminatory police practices. For example, studies report that a dis-
proportionate number of minority motorists are pulled over while act-
ing no differently than their white counterparts.7 2 Despite the danger
of facilitating this practice, the Court in Whren v. United States73
nonetheless validated pretextual stops and searches of cars under the
Fourth Amendment. 4 In addition, under City of Los Angeles v. Ly-
ons, 75 to obtain an injunction against a discriminatory police practice,
a plaintiff must show a high likelihood that he in particular will be in-
jured again.7 6 Thus, the particularity requirement once again presents
a sizeable obstacle to relief for targeted groups.
67 Id. at 458-59.
68 Id. at 459-61.
69 Id. at 465.
70 Id. at 470.
71 Racial profiling remains a controversial issue, and a number of commentators deny its con-
stitutionality. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2006-07 (I998) (suggesting that the use by many police departments of sta-
tistical profiles in which race is a factor is likely unconstitutional). The difficulty of determining
the constitutionality of racial profiling is closely linked to the difficulty posed by disparate impact
theories. See supra p. 2103. To the extent that certain minority groups may on average commit a
greater percentage of certain crimes, profiling is strictly speaking "rational," but other societal
values may make such stereotyping impermissible or undesirable. Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 41o (199i) (rejecting the use of race as a proxy for bias in the peremptory challenge context).
See generally KENNEDY, supra note 63, at 136-67 (discussing the rationality, but undesirability,
of using race as a proxy).
72 See David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Trqffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 56x-69 (1997) (detailing
studies in Florida, Maryland, Illinois, and Colorado).
73 517 U.S. 806 (x996).
74 See id. at 81o, 813 (acknowledging the danger of racially discriminatory pretextual searches
but holding that the applicable provision is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amend-
ment).
75 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
76 Id. at 1o5-o6; see also id. at I11-12 (cautioning judicial restraint when interfering with state
law enforcement in the absence of a substantial risk of irreparable injury). The Court has applied
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL RISK AND THE REMEDY PROBLEM
The shortcomings of the traditional particularized harm require-
ment can be ameliorated by a greater focus on and acknowledgment of
constitutional risks. Drawing from the mass tort context, this shift can
be achieved in two ways: Rather than viewing risk as an irremediable
possibility of harm, one can view risk as a remediable harm in itself.77
Or, one may presume that, given a large enough population, what is
traditionally "only" a risk is statistically certain to materialize into an
"actual" harm:78 yet because the actual manifestation of harm may be
difficult to locate, one may prefer to empower third parties or private
attorneys general for enforcement purposes.
These alternatives are essentially two sides of the same coin, but
this Note pursues only the first.79 Seeing risk as a remediable harm in
itself fits well with the current individualistic conception of causation.
In addition, by characterizing risk as injury in fact, one can address
constitutional risks while avoiding doctrinal standing obstacles.80
Conceptualizing constitutional risks as remediable harms would
address the racial disparity concerns raised in section I.C.8 ' Greater
acceptance of statistical evidence would better enable courts to see po-
tential patterns of discrimination and to assess whether certain aspects
of the criminal process are structured appropriately to minimize dis-
similar principles to discriminatory prosecution. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-99
(1974).
77 See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 481, 485- 8 6 (Wash.
1983) (Pearson, J., concurring); see also NOZICK, supra note 26, at 75-77 (discussing various
methods of compensating risk); cf. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Per-
sonal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353, 1364 (ig81) (advocating "[a] more rational approach ... [that] would allow recovery for the
loss of the chance of cure even though the chance was not better than even").
78 See Rosenberg, supra note i, at 884-87; cf. John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of
American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Move-
ment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 701-04 (2001) (recounting the changes in the law of unintentional
torts that resulted from statistically inevitable industrial accidents).
79 By conceiving of risks as harms, the law must, as a practical matter, deal only with "sub-
stantial" risks to prevent an explosion of claims. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476 (suggesting that
courts may need to limit recovery to "significant" risks). The line between "de minimis" risks and
"substantial" risks is drawn as a matter of policy, just like the one delimiting "proximate" cause.
See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., x62 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); NOZICK, su-
pra note 26, at 76-77 & n.*.
80 See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1464-66 (1988) (explaining why the question of standing rests substantially on the
characterization of the relevant injury).
81 On a theoretical level, the systemic and aggregative approach of a constitutional risk per-
spective may also be more consistent with equal protection than is the particularity approach.
Although the battle against racism has perhaps traditionally had a more individualistic tone, em-
phasizing each person as an individual and not as a stereotype, the concept of equal protection
itself invites comparisons on a systemwide basis. It invites comparisons among sentences, prose-
cutions, and traffic stops. It invites an examination of whether justice is equally distributed.
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crimination. At a minimum, a constitutional risk perspective would
ensure that courts recognize the problem of discrimination in the
criminal justice system.8 2 Even if an effective court-imposed remedy
were unavailable, acceptance of statistical evidence in the courts would
impress the problem of discrimination on both government actors and
the public at large.
Ideally, however, constitutional rights should be enforceable by
adequate remedies.83 Thus, the principal difficulty with achieving ju-
dicial acceptance of the constitutional risk perspective will be finding
effective but appropriately cabined remedies.8 4  As the remainder of
this Part demonstrates, the traditional remedy for constitutional viola-
tions (reversal or dismissal) seems ill suited to address constitutional
risks, as does the more activist remedy of a structural injunction. The
solution rests instead with tweaking the equal protection right itself to
create a requirement of procedural safeguards.
A. Sanctions
r. Dismissal - Dismissal or reversal8  has ordinarily been the
remedy used to redress constitutional violations in the criminal pro-
cess.8 6 A substantial problem with dismissal remedies, however, is the
oft-heard complaint that they are windfalls to defendants.8 7 Defend-
ants are freed not because they are innocent, but rather because of
some problem in the criminal system itself. For this reason, although
equal protection challenges in the criminal law context are perhaps
more in need of redress for reasons of legitimacy and justice, they are
more difficult to vindicate than those in other contexts. Unlike in
other contexts, in which claimants are at least occasionally sympa-
thetic, in the criminal context the claimant is nearly always a con-
82 Acknowledging constitutional risks will invariably require greater use and acceptance of
statistics, and therefore courts may have to develop greater familiarity with and expertise in this
area. As in other fields, however, the use of statistics and probability should be unremarkable. In
the natural sciences, scientists often resort to statistics and probability to describe the physical
world when a system becomes too complex to model using cause and effect relationships. De-
scribed by some as a "mathematical theory of ignorance," when one cannot follow the behavior of
every particle or actor in a system, science settles for describing it holistically through the use of
statistics. See MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS IN WESTERN CULTURE 340-58 (x953).
83 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
84 See Karlan, supra note 71, at 2029 (suggesting that the problems regarding equal protection
and the criminal justice system are "as much about remedies as about rights").
85 Reversal remedies, however, are inappropriate for constitutional risks because the harm in-
volved is systemic and therefore will persist even in a retrial.
86 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 348 (,987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 n.2 (x996) (noting that the Court has not yet ruled
on the appropriate remedy for discriminatory prosecution).
87 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 646
(x996).
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victed defendant. Courts therefore unsurprisingly tend to narrow the
circumstances under which a defendant can obtain a reversal.88
Some might argue that the importance of vindicating equal protec-
tion rights in the criminal justice system justifies the social costs of re-
leasing or retrying guilty defendants. Because defendants have the
greatest incentive to monitor the system, they are needed as private at-
torneys general to deter state actors from unconstitutional behavior.8 9
Nevertheless, the suitability of a private-attorney-general system in the
constitutional risk context does not necessarily follow from its accep-
tance in the traditional context of proven, particularized discrimina-
tion. The right-remedy gap is even more pronounced when the harms
suffered are constitutional risks - traditional harms discounted by
probability. If dismissal for racially motivated prosecution of an oth-
erwise guilty bank robber is already disproportionate, then dismissal
when there was only a risk of racially motivated prosecution is even
more problematic.
Constitutional risk presents an even more serious problem for dis-
missal remedies. Unlike the traditional particularized harm regime, a
constitutional risk regime cannot limit dismissal to a small class of de-
fendants. Because constitutional risk acknowledges a systemic prob-
lem, it would make dismissals available to all future defendants, call-
ing into question the entire criminal justice system.90 This kind of
wide-ranging reductio argument weighed heavily in McCleskeyY 1
2. Rebuttable Presumptions. - One solution to the dismissal prob-
lem would be to allow constitutional risks to create a rebuttable pre-
sumption of constitutional infirmity.92  When a defendant demon-
88 See Karlan, supra note 71, at 2005 (suggesting that concerns about the dismissal remedy led
the Court to use the intent standard to eviscerate equal protection doctrine in the area of selective
prosecution).
89 For a general discussion on the usefulness of granting windfalls to private attorneys general
to enforce constitutional provisions, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by
Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 247 (j988).
90 Cf Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 367 n.15 (xg8i) (Brennan, J., concurring) (acknowl-
edging that if "less than 63 square feet of cell space per inmate were a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment, then approximately two-thirds of all federal, state and local inmates today
would be unconstitutionally confined").
91 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 (expressing concern that McCleskey's claim "would extend
to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant [was]
black"); id. at 314-15 (expressing concern that McCleskey's capital sentencing claim could easily
be extended to all other types of penalty); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 927 (xith
Cir. 1985) (Clark, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that even if racial bias randomly arose in twenty
percent of noncapital convictions, federal courts could not realistically strike down all prosecu-
tions).
92 In the aftermath of McCleskey, Congress considered allowing statistical proof to establish
such a presumption in capital sentencing cases, but the bill ultimately failed. See Racial Justice
Act of 1989, S. 1696, iolst Cong. § 2922(bXI) (i989); cf KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300(3), (5)
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strates an otherwise inexplicable racial disparity, a constitutional viola-
tion would be presumed unless the government could produce a neu-
tral explanation for its behavior. Such presumptions have often been
used in the jury selection and school segregation contexts. 93  Critics
may argue, however, that such rebuttable presumptions create costly
burdens on law enforcement and prosecutors given their limited re-
sources, especially if the collection of statistical and other data justify-
ing racial disparities is costly and difficult.
In addition, a rebuttable presumption still presupposes the exis-
tence of a particularized wrongdoer who can provide a race-neutral
explanation. In the criminal justice system, such explanations are of-
ten unavailable. For example, jury deliberations are strictly confiden-
tial, making an allegation of racial discrimination impossible to rebut.
In these instances, the rebuttable presumption would be no different
than dismissal.
On the flip side, small sample sizes make race-neutral explanations
impossible to refute. Even if juries had open deliberations, they still
convict and sentence only once, and individual prosecutors try few
cases with similar factual situations. In such circumstances, these ac-
tors can easily rationalize potentially discriminatory conduct by giving
race-neutral explanations.9 4 Rebuttable presumptions would therefore
fail to remedy the constitutional risk.
3. Discovery. - Another alternative would be to grant discovery
requests by defendants who raise plausible statistical claims, but to
leave the burden of proof on them. "[M]ost of the relevant proof in se-
lective prosecution cases will normally be in the Government's
hands,"95 so discovery will provide additional data for defendants
seeking to satisfy the traditional requirement of discriminatory pur-
pose. Armstrong, of course, rejected precisely this discovery remedy,96
but that decision arguably rested on the Court's particularized view of
harm: because Armstrong had proven no harm in his particular case,
(Michie x999) (allowing a defendant to use statistics to prove racial discrimination by clear and
convincing evidence).
93 E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (peremptory challenges); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (197) (previously segregated school district); see
Sklansky, supra note 59, at 1318.
94 This problem is one of the reasons that the rule against race-based peremptory challenges
under Batson has essentially been eviscerated. See, e.g., United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448,
1454-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (permitting peremptory challenges to three potential jurors with Hawaiian
surnames for race-neutral reasons such as lack of attentiveness, financial hardship, and having
long hair and a beard); see also Karlan, supra note 71, at 2021 & nn.96-ioi (reporting explana-
tions such as weight, handwriting, clothing, and attitude).
95 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (996) (rejecting discovery for, inter alia, its
possible chilling effect on law enforcement and its potential to reveal the government's enforce-
ment policy).
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he was not entitled to discovery. Were the Court to recognize constitu-
tional risk as an actual harm, one could imagine the Court being more
inclined to grant a discovery "sanction."97
Although granting discovery on the basis of constitutional risk
would be an improvement over the present Armstrong doctrine, dis-
covery too suffers from reliance on particularized wrongdoers. Dis-
covery is only useful to defendants if the information discovered can
prove intent, but short of finding the proverbial "smoking gun," dis-
covery will likely provide only more statistical data, and little will be
gained. And as precedent suggests, only in extreme cases will courts
infer intent solely from statistical disparities.98
4. Proportional Remedies. - Within the realm of compensatory
remedies, constitutional risk faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is
unclear what remedy other than dismissal or a sentence reduction
would provide sufficient incentive for a defendant "to ferret out racial
discrimination."99 On the other hand, dismissal is an overly generous
remedy for constitutional risk. Constitutional risk varies by degrees -
the harm inflicted depends on the magnitude of the risk. Dismissal,
however, is a binary remedy - either a defendant escapes conviction
or he does not. Dismissal is thus a windfall because it cannot be dis-
counted to fit varying levels of harm.
This mismatch between harm and remedy exists at most stages of
the criminal process: decisions to prosecute, convict, or sentence to
death are all binary. But at some stages, such as noncapital sentenc-
ing, differences of degree do exist, theoretically allowing courts to dis-
count for uncertainty. As in the tort context, courts could discount
what would otherwise be full compensation by awarding proportional
remedies. 100 More specifically, if a statistical study (having sufficiently
accounted for all nonracial explanatory factors) were to demonstrate
97 Cf. McAdams, supra note 32, at 658 (arguing that discovery is a useful sanction because it is
costly to prosecutors and is an intermediate remedy); Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion and Selective Prosecution, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. o7i, xogo-98 (1997) (arguing for discovery
as a form of "soft enforcement"). However, although discovery may impose costs on government
actors and deter unconstitutional conduct, it is not a "true" sanction. Unless a reasonable oppor-
tunity for ultimate dismissal accompanies discovery, defendants will lack the adequate incentives
to bring claims.
98 See supra note S.
99 Karlan, supra note 71, at 2028. Civil damages, the common law remedy for rights viola-
tions, seem unhelpful to defendants facing death or incarceration, and defendants also face barri-
ers such as prosecutorial immunity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), and unsym-
pathetic juries, see Karlan, supra note 71, at 2012.
100 Professor William J. Stuntz suggested this insight in private conversation. Cf. Herskovits v.
Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 487 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring)
(suggesting a discount of full compensatory damages to reflect the level of risk imposed by the
wrongdoer); Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 867 (same). For a related discussion in the context of
verdicts, see Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 231 (2O01).
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that the average black defendant received a twenty-five percent
greater prison sentence for a particular crime than did the average
white defendant, then courts could simply reduce a black defendant's
sentence by twenty-five percent. Because all black defendants could
prove this risk, they would all receive the twenty-five percent reduc-
tion. No overdeterrence or windfall would result,101 and the compen-
sation would be directly proportional to the imposed risk.10 2 Courts
might therefore be more amenable to granting proportional relief for
claims of constitutional risk.
Despite the possible benefits of a proportional remedy, this alterna-
tive suffers from a number of significant difficulties, the most obvious
of which is that it amounts to a race-based remedy. Only defendants
of the race at risk would receive reduced sentences, a situation that
raises grave political and equal protection concerns.10 3 Another serious
problem is that proportional remedies may undermine public accep-
tance of court decisions.' 0 4 Observers could find the remedy strange
and the message ambiguous: courts would recognize the existence of
racial discrimination, but rather than develop doctrines to deter or stop
equal protection violations, they would merely cut the baby in half.
B. Structural Injunctions
One might view the mismatch between dismissal and constitutional
risk as the predictable result of applying old fixes to new contexts.
The constitutional risk perspective addresses systemic, not particular-
ized harm. So although a traditional remedy may be preferable to ad-
vocates of judicial restraint, a more systemic remedy may be necessary.
If the goal is systemic change, then structural injunctions seemingly
provide a ready answer. If the system creates constitutional risk, then
why not require changes in the system? Rather than take the circui-
tous route of granting windfalls to guilty defendants to deter govern-
ment discrimination and to eliminate racial disparities, courts could
simply mandate an end to inexplicable racial disparities. 10 s For exam-
101 Prosecutors could not overcharge minority defendants to compensate for the sentencing dis-
count, because such overcharging would itself theoretically exacerbate racial disparities that
would justify greater proportional compensation in the future.
102 See Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 881-85.
103 See Md. Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4 th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts
should employ race-based remedies only as a "last-resort" because "the use of race as a repara-
tional device risks perpetuating the very race-consciousness such a remedy purports to over-
come").
104 Cf. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1382-84 (1985) (explaining how "proportionate awards" may
undermine attempts to shape behavior).
105 Cf Chayes, supra note ig, at 1292-96 (noting the rise of injunctions and other equitable re-
lief in public law litigation).
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pie, an injunction could require the ratcheting up of arrests and prose-
cutions of whites until the disparities disappeared.106
A structural remedy, however, faces substantial obstacles. First, in-
junctions cannot realistically address jury discrimination because ju-
ries are one-time actors and because direct interference with their de-
liberations would raise Sixth Amendment concerns. 107 Second, unlike
injunctions in the prison or school context, injunctions forcing in-
creased prosecutions provide no benefit, and therefore no incentive, to
defendants. 0 Third, as a race-based remedy, a "ratchet-up" injunc-
tion would itself raise equal protection problems. In fact, it would be
far worse than proportional remedies because government actors
would explicitly use race to target individuals for prosecution. 10 9
C. Discretionary Guidelines
Remedies can be arranged along a spectrum of increasing judicial
activism. At one end, sanctions, representing more passive remedies,
use deterrence to influence other branches of government indirectly.
At the other end, structural injunctions are far more active and impose
judicially desired results directly. Both have significant drawbacks in
combating constitutional risks, leading one to search for a middle-
ground solution that would address structural defects with minimal in-
trusiveness. A possible compromise would have courts sanction the
government not for imposing constitutional risks, but for failing to
minimize them through structural safeguards.
106 Courts could also use a "ratchet-up" injunction to address race-of-the-victim discrimination.
See Kennedy, supra note io, at 1390-91.
107 Cf. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Dec-
ades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, io9 HARv. L. REV. 355, 420 (1995) (ar-
guing that a "ratchet-up" is unavailable to enforce equality in capital sentencing because courts
cannot compel decisionmakers to impose that penalty).
108 Presumably, interest groups could take up the mantle, but only if they successfully overcame
third-party standing obstacles.
109 Structural injunctions also implicate concerns about judicial intrusiveness, which often ex-
plain the great reluctance of courts to impose them. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1797-98 (987) (discuss-
ing the McCleskey Court's reluctance to undertake a "wholesale restructuring" of the system); see
also TRIBE, supra note 42, § 16-2o, at isio (suggesting that the Court's use of the discriminatory
intent standard in equal protection cases stems from a "trepidation about embracing the highly
intrusive structural remedies that may be required to root out the entrenched results of racial sub-
jugation'). By interfering with prosecutorial decisions, the judiciary meddles in a traditionally
exclusive province of the executive branch, see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978), and an area in which it is institutionally ill suited to make decisions, see, e.g., Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). Sentencing may be a more appropriate area for judicial
intervention. See Sklansky, supra note 59, at 1316 (arguing that criminal sentencing is "close to
the core" of the judiciary's competence). But even in the sentencing context it is unclear whether
appellate courts are well suited to such fact-based inquiries.
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r. Reining In Discretion. - Discretion is often at the root of dis-
crimination. 1" 0 Theoretically, given a facially race-neutral statute, no
discrimination could occur if government actors had an obligation to
arrest, prosecute, and sentence everyone in exactly the same way. Dis-
cretion, however, is inevitable in practice: rules have gaps;'1 ' discretion
is often desirable in contexts such as sentencing that involve complex
judgment calls;" 2 and broad criminal statutes coupled with limited re-
sources make the prosecution of all crimes impossible." 3 But the fact
that discretion is inevitable does not mean that it must be unbridled.
Courts and legislatures can restrain discretion with guidelines and re-
cord-keeping requirements that reduce the risk of discrimination.
1 4
The existence of an unexplained racial disparity - a constitutional
risk - suggests that the criminal justice system may be according
government actors too much discretion. If one accepts this assertion,
then the racial disparities discussed in section I.C should come as little
surprise. Law enforcement, prosecutorial, and sentencing decisions are
generally governed by few guidelines"' and are often accompanied by
little or no record of their decisionmaking processes. Without records
or standards, appellate courts lack the tools for meaningful review of
discretion; such a scenario, in turn, opens the door to latent discrimina-
tion.
2. Guidelines and Record-keeping. - The above observation sug-
gests a modification of equal protection doctrine in the context of con-
110 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
170 (Illini Books 1971) (x969) ("[T]he power to be lenient is the power to discriminate." (emphasis
omitted)). The concern over the link between discretion and discrimination is not new in criminal
law. It was a motivating factor for regulating grand jury selection, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 496-97 & n.I7 (i977), capital sentencing, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. I53, i88-9i
(1976), and federal sentencing more generally, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.
i, pt. A (2o00). Vagueness doctrine arguably also aims at preventing excessive police discretion
and its accompanying risk of impermissible classifications. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 71-72 (x999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (express-
ing constitutional concerns about unlimited police discretion).
I1I See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36 (2d ed. 1994).
112 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(affirming the constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing in the death penalty
context); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 107, at 381-83 (discussing the tension between
discretion and nonarbitrariness in the death penalty context). In fact, a mandatory death penalty
may actually exacerbate unbridled jury discretion because it may invite jury nullification.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03.
113 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (i997).
114 See Vorenberg, supra note 43, at 1562-72.
115 See Davis, supra note 63, at 35 n.io6 (reporting that "Washington is the only state with
[statutory prosecutorial] guidelines"). The Sentencing Guidelines constrain sentencing discretion
at the federal level, but the same cannot be said for all state sentencing. See Michael Tonry,
7venty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 170
(ig9) (reporting that, as of 1995, more than twenty states had guidelines).
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stitutional risk: if a defendant demonstrates a racial disparity for
which no legitimate explanation exists, a court could grant dismissal
unless the government could show that it had adopted decisionmaking
guidelines'1 6 and, where possible, required decisionmaking records." 7
In effect, statistical disparities would create a presumption of discrimi-
nation, but to rebut the presumption, the government would need only
demonstrate that it has adopted procedural safeguards that limit dis-
cretion and the concomitant risk of discrimination.' 18 This test, which
combines statistical and structural elements, is reminiscent of the doc-
trine dealing with jury discrimination in Castaneda v. Partida,"9
which held that, when a jury selection procedure is susceptible to
abuse, a significant racial disparity is sufficient to establish an equal
protection violation. 120 The Court has subsequently attempted to con-
fine Castaneda to the jury context,' 2' but there is no a priori reason
not to extend it to constitutional risks. 22
From a doctrinal standpoint, any judicially created requirements of
record-keeping and guidelines would be essentially prophylactic rules
to minimize constitutional risks. 23 Courts might impose these re-
quirements with varying degrees of specificity depending on the suc-
cess of early interventions. The substantive details of the guidelines
would likely be left to state legislatures because of their polycentric,
policy-based nature. 2 4 If ultimately unsatisfied, however, courts could
116 Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 365 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (advocating the
use of "guidelines" for prosecutorial discretion in the death penalty context).
117 Record-keeping may not be possible, for example, in the jury context, given strongly held
traditions regarding the secrecy of deliberations.
118 Cf. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 ('999) (allowing an employer to
evade punitive damages for workplace sexual harassment if the employer has an antiharassment
policy and a grievance mechanism in place).
119 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
120 Id. at 494-95. Although the Castaneda elements create only a presumption of discrimina-
tion, id., in the context of multiple actors the presumption is very difficult to refute.
121 Cf. Sklansky, supra note 59, at 1311 (implying that the Court has largely confined Castaneda
to the jury context).
122 See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 502 (Marshall, J., concurring) (suggesting that, at least as of
1977, a statistical disparity and discretionary selection procedures always established a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination); Kennedy, supra note zo, at 142 7-29 (criticizing McCleskey's distinction
of capital sentencing from grand jury selection as "unpersuasive"); see also Developments, supra
note 59, at 155 2-54 (suggesting a modified version of the scheme proposed in this Note).
123 See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. i9o
(x988) (observing that constitutional law is replete with prophylactic rules).
124 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404
(1978) (suggesting that legislatures are the institutions most competent to make decisions that
carry multiple and complex repercussions involving many actors). This partnership between
courts and state legislatures would parallel the Supreme Court's intervention in capital sentencing
in the 1970s. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95 (4976) (plurality opinion).
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offer certain procedures as safe harbors or even as constitutional re-
quirements. 2 '
The requirements of guidelines and record-keeping accomplish four
important goals. First, guidelines constrain discretion by providing a
decisionmaking framework. Concededly, guidelines cannot eliminate
all racism in the criminal process, but they can at least minimize it by
reducing the range of discretion available to government actors.
126
Second, record-keeping and guidelines create greater transparency,
forcing government actors to make reasoned justifications and deter-
ring them from using impermissible factors.' 27  Third, decisionmaking
standards and records provide appellate courts with the necessary
tools for meaningful review.128 Indeed, even if appellate courts are ill
suited for reviewing executive discretion,1 29 the mere threat of review
has normative value and may alter behavior.130 Finally, the implemen-
tation of guidelines benefits all defendants equally - unlike structural
injunctions and proportional remedies, it is not a race-based remedy.
3. Potential Concerns. - Discretionary guidelines do, however,
have some inherent drawbacks. Naturally, they limit prosecutorial
discretion, which the Court has recognized as essential in a resource-
constrained world. 131 Guidelines also limit the ability of all actors in
the system - police, prosecutors, and judges - to dispense individual-
ized justice. 32  The problem is that catering to the individual case
12S Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (suggesting a safe-harbor proce-
dure that would satisfy Fifth Amendment requirements but encouraging legislatures to develop
their own solutions), with Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332-36 (2000) (interpreting
Miranda as announcing a constitutionally mandated prophylactic rule).
126 But see Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 478-8, (iggg) (noting that despite the
Department of Justice's elaborate death penalty review process, federal death sentencing exhibits
even greater racial disparities than state death sentencing).
127 If government actors remained undeterred, such records could be used for further litigation.
See Harris, supra note 72, at 566 (reporting the statistical evidence of racial disparities that Mary-
land police generated after a settlement required greater record-keeping of certain traffic stops).
128 See Strauss, supra note 123, at 196 (suggesting that "clear standards make it easier for a
court reviewing the official's action to determine if it was influenced by an impermissible consid-
eration"); cf. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (198o)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing the need for intelligible principles to facilitate judicial re-
view of administrative decisions).
129 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
130 For example, the constitutional ban on race-based peremptory challenges established by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, oo (x986), may be a paper tiger, see supra note 94, but its
"shadow effects" arguably have tangible value. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, go COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2112 (iggo) (arguing that clear statement rules and the
nondelegation doctrine operate as "second-best surrogatels]" in light of the "intrusiveness and un-
wieldiness" of large-scale judicial review).
131 See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 6o8-o9 (1985).
132 Cf., e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 482 U.S. 279, 314 n.37 (987) (declaring "discretion essential to
a humane and fair system of criminal justice").
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necessarily undermines the uniformity of legal rules. 133  Mercy may
temper justice, but mercy requires discretion, and discretion allows
discrimination.1 34  Thus, the best one can hope to achieve is a bal-
ance,1 35 and by retaining but narrowing discretion, discretionary
guidelines reduce the risk of discrimination while preserving a modi-
cum of individualized justice.
More fundamentally, critics may ask whether courts, as compared
to legislatures, are the appropriate institutions to implement systemic
changes. 136 Legislatures, however, have perverse incentives to draft
overinclusive criminal statutes and to defer to prosecutors: broad
criminalization maximizes politically popular "law and order" rhetoric,
and extensive prosecutorial discretion minimizes legislatures' blame for
perceived miscarriages of justice.' 37  In addition, discretionary guide-
lines are not nearly as intrusive as the structural injunctions described
in section II.B. A prophylactic rule requiring discretionary guidelines
would mandate only that legislatures constrain discretion, either by
legislating directly or by delegating the authority to develop guidelines
to police, prosecutors, and trial courts. 13 8 A guidelines approach to
constitutional risk would leave considerable leeway for local officials to
develop their own systems to limit discretion. Only in the face of con-
sistent failure would the judiciary need to increase its involvement.
And even if courts shunned more intrusive measures as overly activist,
the mere recognition of the problem might spur other branches to de-
velop appropriate remedies.' 3 9
133 See Callins v. Collins, 51o U.S. 1141, 1144 (x994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and
discrimination from the administration of death can never be achieved without compromising an
equally essential component of fundamental fairness - individualized sentencing." (citation omit-
ted)).
134 Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 107, at 391 (explaining how standardless consideration of
mitigating evidence makes discrimination possible in death penalty sentencing).
135 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 n.35 (discussing the essential need to balance uniformity and
discretion).
136 See id. at 319 (maintaining that legislatures are the appropriate institutions).
137 See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 15-19 (x996).
138 Cf Strauss, supra note 123, at 200--01 (defending Miranda's prophylactic rule as less judi-
cially imperialistic than rigid overbreadth doctrines in the First Amendment context because it
allows for legislative alternatives).
139 For example, instead of courts imposing prophylactic rules, Congress could legislate guide-
lines that were "congruent and proportional" to the harms involved. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 530-33 (1997); TRIBE, supra note 42, § 16-2o, at 1514 n.97 (speculating that
McCleskey left room for Congress to regulate, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
state death penalty procedures that discriminate against racial minorities).
2120 [Vol. 11i4:2098
HeinOnline  -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2120 2000-2001
CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS
III. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the consequences of a shift in the equal
protection context - a move from a traditional particularized harm
perspective to a constitutional risk perspective focused on systemic
harms. It has also acknowledged the significant remedial difficulties
associated with constitutional risk, but by focusing on discretion as the
source of most equal protection risks, this Note has proposed a moder-
ate doctrinal change: discretionary safeguards.
To be sure, this Note leaves the project substantially incomplete.
Constitutional risk's focus on statistical evidence requires careful dis-
cussion of the pitfalls judges face in this area and of how they can de-
velop expertise in response. Additionally, because one need not con-
fine the constitutional risk perspective to equal protection, it may
usefully be extended to inform other constitutional doctrines, such as
facial challenges and prophylactic rules. 140 In extending constitutional
risk, however, one should remember that shifting to a risk-based view
of constitutional law represents a genuine policy decision. Never have
laws protected every individual against every risk - to do so is neither
practical nor possible. Therefore, one must determine which risks are
substantial enough to warrant a remedy. Even more crucially, one
must decide if constitutional risk is a transsubstantive doctrine, or
whether only some constitutional harms are serious enough to require
a more systemic and nuanced look.'41  All this remains for another
day.
140 A cursory examination reveals that the idea of constitutional risk may be latent in many
areas of constitutional law. For example, one can view overbreadth doctrine and some facial chal-
lenges not as redressing actual harm (as in the case of an as-applied challenge), but as removing a
risk of constitutional harm from the plaintiff's environment. The same is true for prophylactic
rules, which address not constitutional harms ex post, but the risk of future constitutional harms
ex ante. See Strauss, supra note 123, at 198-200 (suggesting that levels of constitutional scrutiny
are in effect prophylactic rules).
141 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 132 1, 1342-56 (2000) (arguing that facial challenge doctrine is not transsubstantive
but rather reflects specific doctrinal tests).
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